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Abstract. This paper examines the long run and causal relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
economic growth in Nigeria for the period 1970 to 2012 using time series data. Results from a 
multivariate VAR model provide evidence of long run relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
economic growth in Nigeria. The three measures of fiscal decentralization have a positive and significant 
relationship with economic growth, Granger Causality test reveals long run unidirectional link running 
from fiscal decentralization to economic growth. The study recommends the need for government to 
urgently address the constitutional issue of fiscal powers among the three tiers of government to further 
strengthen the fiscal base of the state and local governments and increase further the level of fiscal 
decentralization. 
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1. Introduction 
Fiscal decentralization is the devolution of fiscal responsibilities by the federal 
government to sub national governments to enhance efficiency in public service 
delivery and thereby promote economic growth and development (Ewetan, 2011). It is 
essentially about the allocation of government resources and spending to the various 
tiers of government (Oates, 1972; Tanzi 1995). To enhance growth and development 
potentials developing countries have embraced the decentralization of public spending 
and revenue collection from central governments to sub national governments 
(Aigbokhan, 1999). Thus, the issues of tax jurisdictions, expenditure assignment and 
which tier of government can best deliver public service to accelerate economic growth 
and development continues to be the focus of active and extensive research (Iwayemi, 
2013). 
 
The pioneer works of Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1989) and Oates (1972) kick started the 
literature on the nexus between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. Many 
industrialized federal countries like Canada, United States, Germany, Austrialia, and 
Brazil have developed elaborate forms of fiscal arrangement between the central and 
other levels of government to address the issues of tax jurisdictions, expenditure 
assignment and intergovernmental transfers (Ewetan, 2011; Anyanwu, 1999; Aigbokhan, 
1999; Tella, 1999). In many developing countries fiscal decentralization is being 
embraced as a strategy for breaking the dominance of centralization of government 
fiscal operations to bring these countries unto a sustainable growth path (Oates, 1999, 
Ewetan, 2011). 
 
The financial hegemony enjoyed by the federal government over the 36 states, a Federal 
Capital Territory and 774 local government areas is a product of long years of military 
rule and the centralized nature of the military hierarchical structure (Ewetan, 2011). 
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According to Iwayemi (2013) “The centralizing tendencies imposed on the nation’s 
fiscal federalism by the 1999 Constitution, a legacy of military dictatorship still continue 
to generate contentious debate a decade and half later”. The contentious debate has 
assumed violent dimensions and even arm struggle against the state by the Niger Delta 
militant and agitation for resource control. 
 
Despite the widening appeal of fiscal decentralization, findings in the empirical 
literature are inconclusive on its impact on economic growth in Nigeria. While some 
studies revealed a positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic 
growth (Chete, 1998; Ewetan, 2011; Philip and Isah, 2012), others found a negative 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth in Nigeria 
(Aigbokhan, 1999; Philip and Isah, 2012). The contradiction in the empirical literature 
on Nigeria provides the motivation for a re-examination of the relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and economic growth in Nigeria. Also this study will examine 
the issue of causality between fiscal decentralization and economic growth which 
previous studies did not consider. 
 
2. Theoretical Basis for Fiscal Federalism 
The basic foundations for the initial theory of Fiscal Federalism were laid by Kenneth 
Arrow, Richard Musgrave and Paul Sadweh Samuelson. Samuelson’s two important 
papers (1954, 1955) on the theory of public goods, Arrows discourse (1970) on the roles 
of the public and private sectors and Musgrave’s book (1959) on public finance 
provided the framework for what became accepted as the proper role of the state in the 
economy. 
 
Within this framework, three roles were identified for the government sector. These 
were the roles of government in correcting for various forms of market failure, ensuring 
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an equitable distribution of income and seeking to maintain stability in the macro-
economy at full employment and stable prices. The theoretical framework in question 
was basically a Keynesian one which canvassed for an activist role of the state in 
economic affairs. Thus the government was expected to step in where the market 
mechanism failed due to various types of public goods characteristics. Economics 
teaches us that public goods will be under-provided if left to private market mechanism 
since the private provider would under invest in their provision because the benefits 
accruable to the provider would be far lower than the total benefit to society. 
Government and their officials were seen as the custodians of public interest who 
would seek to maximize social welfare based on their benevolence or need to ensure 
electoral success in democracies. 
 
The assumption of a multi-level government setting in place, and the role of the state in 
maximizing social welfare provides the basic ingredients for the theory of fiscal 
federalism in which each tier of government seeks to maximize the social welfare of the 
citizens within its jurisdiction. This multi-layered quest becomes very important where 
public goods exists, the consumption of which is not national in character, but localized. 
In such circumstances, local outputs targeted at local demands by respective local 
jurisdictions clearly provide higher social welfare than central provision. This principle, 
which Oates (1972) formalized into the “Decentralization Theorem” constitutes the 
basic foundation referred to as the first generation theory of fiscal decentralization 
(Oates, 2006). The theory focuses on situations where different levels of government 
provide efficient levels of outputs of public goods “for those goods whose special 
patterns of benefits are encompassed by the geographical scope of jurisdictions” (Oates, 
2006b). Such situation came to be known as “perfect mapping” or “fiscal equivalence” 
(Ma, 1995). 
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Nevertheless, it was also recognized that, given the multiplicity of local goods with 
varying geographical patterns of consumption, there was hardly any level of 
government that could produce a perfecting mapping for all public goods. Thus, it is 
recognized that there would be local public goods with inter-jurisdictional spill-overs. 
For example, a road may confer public goods characteristics, the benefits of which are 
enjoyed beyond the local jurisdiction. The local authority may then under-provide for 
such a good. To avoid this, the theory then resort to traditional Pigouvian subsidies, 
requiring the central government to provide matching grants to the lower level 
government so that it can internalize the full benefits. 
 
Based on the following, the role of government in maximizing social welfare through 
public goods provision is assigned to the lower tiers of government. The other two roles 
of income distribution and stabilization are regarded as suitable for the central 
government. To understand the rationale for assignment of the redistribution function 
to the central government, there is the need to examine what the implications of 
assigning this responsibility to the lower tier would imply. Given that citizens are freely 
mobile across local or regional jurisdictions, a lower level jurisdiction that embarks on a 
programme of redistribution from the rich to the poor is faced with the out-migration of 
the rich to non-redistributing jurisdictions and in-migration of the poor from such 
jurisdictions to the redistributing one. If on the other hand, the powers to redistribute 
are vested in the central government, a redistribution policy would apply equally to 
citizens resident in all jurisdictions. There would therefore be no induced migration. 
 
The assignment of the stabilization function also follows from the chaos that would 
ensue if sub-central governments are assigned the responsibility. Sub national policies 
will lead to sub-optimal policies from the point of view of national welfare. Moreover, 
given the openness that characterizes the relationship between the regional 
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governments, they are grossly constrained in carrying out effective stabilization policies. 
This is because these lower tiers of government have very limited capacity to influence 
local employment levels and inflation (Bonfim and Shah, 2007). 
 
From the foregoing, the role assignment which flows from the basic theory of fiscal 
federalism is summarized as follows: The central government is expected to ensure 
equitable distribution of income, maintain macroeconomic stability and provide public 
goods that are national in character. Decentralized levels of government on the other 
hand are expected to concentrate on the provision of local public good with the central 
government providing targeted grants in cases where there are jurisdictional spill-overs 
associated with local public goods. 
 
Once the assignment of roles had been carried out, the next step in the theoretical 
framework is to determine the appropriate taxing framework. In addressing this tax 
assignment problem, attention is paid to the need to avoid distortions resulting from 
decentralized taxation of mobile tax bases. Gordon (1983) emphasizes that the extensive 
application of non-benefit taxes on mobile factors at decentralized levels of government 
could result in distortions in the location of economic activity. 
Following from the assignment of functions, taxes that matched more effectively the 
assigned functions are also assigned to the relevant tier or level of government. For 
example, progressive income tax is suited to the functions of income redistribution and 
macro-economic stabilization and is therefore assigned to the central government. On 
the other hand, property taxes and user fees were deemed more appropriate for local 
governments. Benefits taxes are also prescribed for decentralized government based on 
the conclusion that such taxes promote economic efficiency when dealing with mobile 
economic units, be they individual or firms (Olson, 1982). 
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The final element of this basic theory is the need for fiscal equalization. This is in the 
form of lump sum transfers from the central government to decentralized governments. 
The arguments for equalization are mainly two. The first which is on efficiency grounds 
sees equalization as a way of correcting for distorted migration patterns. The second is 
to provide assistance to poorer regions or jurisdictions. Equalization is important in a 
number of federations. For example, Canada has an elaborate equalization scheme built 
into her inter-governmental fiscal arrangements (Boadway and Hobson, 2009). 
 
It necessary to point out that recent literature emphasizes the importance of reliance on 
own revenues for financing local budgets. A number of authors (Weingast, 1997; 
Mckinnon, 1997) draw attention to the dangers of decentralized levels of government 
relying too heavily on intergovernmental transfers for financing their budgets. These 
are lessons that Nigeria’s fiscal system should draw from. 
 
3. Review of Related Literature 
While theoretically fiscal decentralization promotes economic growth via efficiency 
gains, empirical evidence is mixed and inconclusive. Oates (1999) finds a significant and 
robust positive correlation between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. 
Shahdani et al (2012) find a linear positive relationship between expenditure 
decentralization and economic growth, however revenue decentralization appears to 
have nonlinear positive effect on economic growth. Iimi (2005) using the instrument 
variables technique finds that fiscal decentralization has a significant positive impact on 
per capita GDP growth. Sakata (2002) finds robust evidence that fiscal decentralization 
contributes to economic growth in United States. Ismail and Hamzah (2006) using a 
production function based estimation framework and cross-section data for Indonesia 
find a positive and significant relationship between expenditure decentralization and 
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economic growth, and a negative insignificant relationship between revenue 
decentralization and economic growth.  
 
Similarly Lin and Liu (2000) detect a positive impact of fiscal decentralization on 
China’s overall growth rate attributed to efficiency improvements of resource allocation 
rather than higher investment drive. On the contrary Zhang and Zou (1998) find a 
significant and robust negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and China’s 
provincial economic growth linked to decentralized key infrastructure projects with 
nation-wide externalities.  The contrasting findings from these two studies on China 
show that fiscal decentralization induces diverse growth performance at the national 
and at the provincial level. Yilma (1999) finds a significant positive relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and per capita growth for unitary countries, while the results for 
federal countries are inconclusive. Zhang and Zou (1998) detect a positive effect of per 
capita fiscal decentralization shares on Indian regional economic growth, albeit the 
effect is only significant in the case of the capita revenue share.  
 
Xie et al (1999) find for the US states that further decentralization in public spending 
may be harmful for growth. Davoodi and Zou (1998) using a panel data set of 46 
countries find a non-significant negative relationship between fiscal decentralization 
and economic growth in developing countries, but none in developed countries. 
Similarly Woller and Phillips (1998) find no significant and robust relationship in LDCs 
but detected a weak relationship between the revenue share and growth..  
 
The findings in the empirical literature on the nature of the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and economic growth in Nigeria are mixed and inconclusive. Ewetan 
(2011) using time series data in a study on Nigeria from 1970 to 2007 finds that fiscal 
decentralization has a significant positive impact on economic growth. Philip and Isah 
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(2012) used three different measures of decentralization in their study on Nigeria. They 
find a non-significant positive relationship between revenue decentralization and 
economic growth, and a significant negative relationship between expenditure 
decentralization and economic growth. On the contrary Aigbokhan (1999) finds a 
negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. The 
contradictory findings in the empirical literature on Nigeria provides the motivation for 
this study to further re-examine the nature of the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and economic growth in Nigeria. 
 
4. Methodology, Model Specification and Data 
Given the mixed results from previous studies in the literature the model used in this 
study is an extension from other studies (Ram, 1986 and Aigbokhan, 1996; 1999; Ewetan, 
2011). The model assumes that the economy consists of two broad sectors, public (G) 
and private (P) whose output depends on labour (L) and capital (K). In addition, the 
output of G exercises some externality effect on output in P. The production function of 
the economy is thus: 
Y = f (L, KP ,KG ) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(1) 
where the subscripts p and g denote the private and public sectoral inputs respectively. 
Total inputs are given as: 
LT = LP + LG-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(2) 
KT = KP + KG------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(3) 
The production functions of the two sectors are thus: 
YP  =  P(LP, KP, G) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------(4) 
YG  = G(LG, KG ) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(5) 
Total output Y is given as the sum of sectoral output or a function of sectoral inputs: 
Y = YP + YG, or ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(6) 
Y = P(LP, KP, G) + G(LG, KG), or --------------------------------------------------------------------(7) 
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Y =  LT + KT + GT)------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(8) 
The model further assumes a federal state in which public spending is carried out by 
three levels of government: federal (f), state (s), and local (m). This fiscal arrangement is 
stated thus: 
Y= f + s + m -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(9) 
Introducing fiscal decentralization (FD) variable into the model to replace variable (GT) 
equation 8 becomes: 
Y= L + K + FD ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(10) 
The size of GT in equation 8 depends on the level of fiscal decentralization (FD) in 
equation 10. The structural form of the basic growth equation 10 takes the form: 
Y =   0 +  1Lt +  2Kt +  3FDt +  t -------------------------------------------------------------(11) 
Where 𝛼0 is the constant term which incorporates the influence of technical on growth 
and𝜇t is the error term.There is the need to find out other possible influence on the 
model. Government financial operations at all levels of governance contribute 
significantly to money supply which impacts on economic growth. Therefore equation 
(11) is re-specified with money supply (MS) as a determining factor. 
Y = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1Lt  +𝛼2Kt + 𝛼3FDt + 𝛼4MSt + 𝜇t -------------------------------------------------------(12) 
Equation (12) is transformed to natural logarithms for the conventional statistical 
reasons: 
logYit= α0 +𝛼1logLt+ 𝛼2logKt + 𝛼3logFDt + 𝛼4logMSt + 𝜇t -----------------------------------(13) 
 
The consensus in the literature is that an operational measure of decentralization is the 
share of decentralized expenditures and revenues of state and local governments in the 
nation’s total fiscal activities (Ubogu, 1982). However the empirical literature contains 
different measures of decentralization. Zhang and Zou (1996) measure it as the ratio of 
total subnational spending to total central spending, while Ehdaie(1994) measures it as 
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the ratio of total subnational governments own-source revenues over total 
national(federal plus subnational) expenditures. This study employs three measures of 
fiscal decentralization; (i) subnational fiscal autonomy or revenue measure (FD1); (ii) 
sub national spending share or expenditure measure (FD2); (iii) and sub national 
dependency or simultaneity measure (FD3) to determine the extent, and the impact of 
fiscal decentralization on economic growth in Nigeria over the study period 1970 to 
2012. Other variables of the model are defined as follows; Y is real gross domestic 
product; L is the labour force; K is the stock of physical capital; MS is the money supply; 
𝛼0 is the constant term,‘t’ is the time trend, and ‘𝜇’ is the random error term. 
 
4.1 Model Estimation Technique 
In terms of econometric methodology, the multivariate cointegration approach offers 
useful insights towards testing for causal relationship. In principle, two or more 
variables are adjudged to be cointegrated when they share a common trend. Hence, the 
existence of cointegration implies that causality runs in at least one direction (Okodua 
and Ewetan, 2013; Akinlo and Egbetunde, 2010; Granger, 1988). However there could be 
exceptions to this expectation. The cointegration and error correction methodology is 
extensively used and well documented in the literature (Banerjee, et al. 1993; Johansen 
and Juselius, 1990; Johansen, 1988; Engle and Granger, 1987). Johansen (1988) 
multivariate cointegration model is based on the error correction representation given 
by: 
∆Xt = 𝜇 + ∑ 𝜏
𝜌−1
𝑖=1 I ∆Xt –i  +∏Xt – 1 + 𝜀t -----------------------------------------------------(14) 
 
Where Xt is an (nx1) column vector of ρ variables, μ is an (nx1) vector of constant terms, 
Г and Π represent coefficient matrices, ∆ is a difference operator, and ε_t−N(0,∑). The 
coefficient matrix Π is known as the impact matrix, and it contains information about 
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the long-run relationships. Johansen’s methodology requires the estimation of the VAR 
equation (3.3) and the residuals are then used to compute two likelihood ratio (LR) test 
statistics that can be used in the determination of the unique cointegrating vectors of Xt. 
The cointegrating rank can be tested with two statistics, the trace test and the maximal 
eigenvalue test. 
 
4.2 Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
The error correction version pertaining to the five variables (Y, L, K, MS, FD) used in the 
study is stated below: 
∆Yt =𝛼o +  ∑ ∝n𝑖=0 1t∆Yt – 1 + ∑ 𝛼
n
𝑖=0 2t∆Lt-1 + ∑ 𝛼
n
𝑖=0 3t∆Kt-1 +∑ 𝛼
n
𝑖=0 4t∆MSt-1 + ∑ 𝛼
n
𝑖=0 5t∆FDt-1 -- (15) 
 
Where ECMt-1 is the error correction term and ε_t is the mutually uncorrelated white 
noise residual. The coefficient of the ECM variable contains information about whether 
the past values of variables affect the current values of the variable under study. The 
size and statistical significance of the coefficient of the error correction term in each 
ECM model measures the tendencies of each variable to return to the equilibrium. A 
significant coefficient implies that past equilibrium errors play a role in determining the 
current outcomes. The short run dynamics are captured through the individual 
coefficients of the difference terms. The short run dynamics are captured through the 
individual coefficients of the difference terms. Fiscal decentralization (FD) does not 
Granger cause economic growth (Y) if all α_2t=0, and Economic growth (Y) does not 
Granger cause fiscal decentralization (FD) if all β_(2t ) = 0. According to Akinlo and 
Egbetunde (2010), and Mehra, (1994) these hypotheses can be tested using standard F 
statistics  
 
4.3 Stationarity Tests 
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There is the possibility of co-integration when each variable is integrated of the same 
order d≥1. This necessary, but rarely sufficient, condition implies that the series share a 
common trend. Therefore to ascertain whether mean reversion is characteristic of each 
variable the paper used both Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test by Dickey and Fuller 
(1979, 1981), and Phillip-Perron (PP)  test by Phillips (1987) and Phillips Perron (1988) to 
infer the stationarity properties of the study series. This is conducted, with intercept 
only and intercept and trend respectively, on the levels and first difference of the series.  
 
4.4 Granger Causality Test 
Granger causality tests are performed to find out the direction of the causal link 
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. The Granger causality approach 
measures the precedence and information provided by a variable (X) in explaining the 
current value of another variable (Y). The basic rationale of Granger causality is that the 
change in fiscal decentralization Granger causes the change in economic growth if past 
values of the change in fiscal decentralization improve unbiased least-square 
predictions about the change in economic growth. The null hypothesis H0 tested is that 
X does not granger-cause Y and Y does not granger-cause X. 
 
5.0 Empirical Results and Discussions 
This section presents the results of the unit root, cointegration, vector error correction, 
and Granger causality tests conducted. 
 
5.1 Stationarity Tests 
To avoid spurious regression outcomes, the paper used both the Augments Dickey-
Fuller and Phillip-Perron (PP) tests to find the existence of unit root in each of the time 
series. Table 1 summarizes the results of both the ADF and PP tests conducted with 
intercept only and intercept and trend respectively. A variable is stationary when the 
ADF and PP values are greater than the critical value (CV) at a given level (1%, 5%, and 
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10%, denoted as *, **, ***, respectively). Since all the variables were non stationary in 
levels they were all differenced once. Table 1 shows that all the variables were 
stationary after first differencing (that is, the variables are integrated of order one), 
meaning that the variables are I(1) series. 
 
Table 1. Unit Root Test for Stationarity at First Difference 
Variables ADF (Intercept) ADF (Intercept 
   and Trend) 
PP (Intercept) PP (Intercept and 
   Trend) 
    InY   4.372(-2.981)**   6.154(-4.324)* - 7.432(-3.679)* - 9.238(-4.324)* 
    InL   6.378(-3.744)*   6.122(-4.309)* - 5.332(-3.689)* - 7.223(-4.324)* 
    InK - 4.664(-3.689)* - 5.662(-4.324)* - 4.795(-3.679)* - 5.659(-4.309)* 
InMS - 5.298(-3.689)* - 6.133(-4.324)* - 9.546(-3.689)* - 10.569(-4.324)* 
   InFD1 - 4.788(-3.679)* - 4.989(-4.309)* - 4.762(-3.679)* - 4.873(-4.309)* 
   InFD2 - 5.198(-3.679)* - 5.266(-4.324)* - 5.396(-3.679)* - 5.257(-4.309)* 
   lnFD3   6.263((-3.679)* 5.795(-4.309)*   4.963(-3.679)*   4.638(-4.309)* 
Note: *,** and*** indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance respectively. Figures within 
parentheses indicate critical values. 
Source: Author’s Estimation using Eviews 7.0.  
 
5.2 Cointegration Result 
Having established that all the variables of the study are integrated of order one, the 
Johansen-Juselius approach described in the methodology is used to test for the 
existence of cointegration relationship among the variable series. Table 2 and 3report 
the cointegration test results for model 1, 2 and 3. The results confirm the existence of 
cointegration between the three measures of fiscal decentralization, economic growth, 
labour, real capita stock and money supply. The trace statistic and the maximum 
eigenvalue statistic reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 5 per cent level (0.05 
level). 
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Table 2: Unrestricted Co-integration Rank Test (Trace) 
  Hypothesized 
  No of CE(s) 
  Eigenvalue   Trace Statistic      0.05 
  Critical Value 
  Probability 
Model 1: FD1 as a Measure of Fiscal Decentralization 
  None*   0.845758   69.31624   45.75782   0.0003 
   At most 1 
 
  0.976677   22.47234   27.68945   0.2211 
Model 2: FD2 as a Measure of Fiscal Decentralization 
  None*   0.766453   73.47724   45.75782   0.0001 
  At most 1   0.473667   23.23875   27.68945   0.1221 
Model 3: FD3 as a Measure of Fiscal Decentralization 
  None*   0.737854   65.45231   45.75782   0.0012 
  At most 1   0.422975   22.27775   27.68945   0.1432 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegratingeqn at the 0.05 level 
*denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
Table 3: Unrestricted Co-integration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
  Hypothesized 
  No of CE(s) 
  Eigenvalue   Max-Eigen 
  Statistic 
     0.05 
  Critical Value 
  Probability 
                               Model 1: FD1 as a Measure of Fiscal Decentralization 
  None*   0.845758   46.54328   25.67342   0.0003 
  At most 1   0.976677   19.15421   22.23145   0.0892 
                               Model 2: FD2 as a Measure of Fiscal Decentralization  
  None*   0.766453   41.20346   25.67342   0.0002 
  At most 1   0.473667   16.45443   22.23145   0.1882 
                               Model 3: FD3 as a Measure of Fiscal Decentralization  
  None*   0.737854   36.80813   25.67342   0.0019 
  At most 1   0.422975   14.83123   22.23145    0.3005 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegratingeqn at the 0.05 level 
*denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
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Table 4: Long Run Normalized Cointegration Estimates 
Normalized Cointegration Coefficients (standard error estimates) 
LnY LnL LnK LnMS LnFD1 LnFD2 LnFD3 
1.000000 
 
-1.56721 
(0.0462344) 
0.0342125 
(0.0252782) 
-0.3215632 
(0.0721532) 
-0.1203265 
(0.0213527) 
-0.0324132 
(0.0312673) 
-0.0033642 
(0.0154276) 
 {-24.23} {0.14} {-4.13} {3.24) {4.52} {3.75} 
P>|𝑧| 0.000 0.728 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Note: Standard error and Z-Statistics are stated in parenthesis as () and {} respectively. 
Source: Author’s Estimation using Stata 10.0 
 
Table 4 above shows the normalized cointegration coefficients of the variables in this 
study model. The results in the table are explained with respect to the signs and 
magnitude of the variables in the normalized cointegration result. The probability 
statistic (P>|𝑧|) is used to determine whether or not a variable is significant at a 5% level. 
The null hypothesis states that the variable is not statistically different from zero and is 
thus insignificant while the alternative hypothesis states that the variable is statistically 
different from zero and is thus significant. With a P-value less than 0.05, the null 
hypothesis cannot be accepted that the variable is statistically different from zero and is 
thus significant. The coefficient of the variables shows if the independent variable has a 
positive or negative relationship with the dependent variable. The coefficient values of 
the three measures of fiscal decentralization (FD1, FD2, FD3), labour force (L) and money 
supply (MS) have a positive and significant relationship with economic growth (Y) in 
accordance with a priori expectation at 0.05 level of significance, while the gross fixed 
capital formation (K) has a negative and insignificant relationship with economic 
growth at 0.05 level of significance which deviates from a priori expectation, 
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5.3. Error Correction Model 
When cointegration exists, the Engle-Granger Theorem establishes the encompassing 
power of the ECM over other forms of dynamic specification (Akinlo and Egbetunde, 
2010). The error correction term measures the speed of adjustment to restore 
equilibrium in the dynamic model. The error correction coefficient shows how 
quickly/slowly variables return to equilibrium and it should have a statistically 
significant coefficient with a negative sign. A highly significant error correction term is 
further proof of the existence of a stable long-term relationship (Bannerjee et al. 1993). 
Table 5 below shows that the error correction coefficient has the expected negative sign 
and lies between the usual range of 0 and 1. Precisely, this speed of adjustment is -0.41 
suggesting that about 41 percent of errors generated in each period is automatically 
corrected by the system in the subsequent period and is statistically significant at 1 
percent level. 
 
Table 5: Error Correction Model 1 
   Dependent Variable ΔFD1 
Included observations; 29 after adjustments 
      Variable                              Coefficient    Std. Error                 t-statistic  
   ECMt-1                                          -0.413254*                     0.31267               -2.84254  
   C                                         -171003.14                     19023     -0.33626  
   ΔFD1(-1)                           0.412172                        0.27640                1.13366  
   ΔY(-1)                                  19.23562                        18.8178                1.40058  
   ΔL(-1)                                  14.432751                      5.1489                  0.89623  
   ΔK(-1)                                  15.231424                     3972.4                  -0.50478  
   ∆MS(-1)                               32.42374                       21.4528                 1.57853  
   R-squared                            0.424278                      Mean dependent var.            
   Adj. R-squared                  0.263428                       S.D. dependent var.             
   F-statistic                            3.212436                      Akaike AIC                            
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Δ is the difference operator. *, stands for statistical significance at the 1% level. 
Table 6 below shows that the error correction coefficient has the expected negative sign 
and lies between the usual range of 0 and 1. Precisely, this speed of adjustment is -0.33 
suggesting that about 33 percent of errors generated in each period is automatically 
corrected by the system in the subsequent period and is statistically significant at 1 
percent level. 
 
Table 6: Error Correction Model 2 
    Dependent Variable ΔFD2 
 Included observations; 29 after adjustments 
 Variable   Coefficient                         Std. Error     t-statistic                
 ECMt-1                                               -0.312174*                           0.04480                             0.62051  
 C        75643.52                            144753   -0.64423 
 ΔFD2(-1)                                   0.573852                            0.23530                              4.43863 
 ΔY(-1)                                  0.156486                            7.43764                              0.02945 
 ΔL(-1)                                 -0.032341                            5.27742                            -0.01572 
 ΔK(-1)                               4284.246                          21231.7          -0.85345 
 ∆MS(-1)                            7324.231      32162.6         0.63214 
 R-squared                         0.693276    Mean dependent var.            
 Adj. R-squared               0.583762        S.D. dependent var.              
 F-statistic                         8.534862     Akaike AIC     
Δ is the difference operator. *, stands for statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table 7 below shows that the error correction coefficient has the expected negative sign 
and lies between the usual range of 0 and 1. Precisely, this speed of adjustment is -0.52 
suggesting that about 52 percent of errors generated in each period is automatically 
corrected by the system in the subsequent period and is statistically significant at 1 
percent level. 
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Table 7: Error Correction Model 3 
   Dependent Variable ΔFD3 
Included observations; 29 after adjustments 
  Variable    Coefficient     Std. Error                            t-statistic                
 ECMt-1                                              -0.524786                              0.23645                              -2.78872  
 C       938.276519                          8.923                                    2.32463  
 ΔFD3(-1)                                -0.353278                             0.25475                              -2.34943  
 ΔY(-1)                                 -3.561894                              0.35875                              -1.73875  
 ΔL(-1)                                 -1.231594                             7.15693                                 4.54841  
 ΔK(-1)                                  8.241935                              9.13479                                 3.67397  
 ∆MS(-1)                               9658.672                              53245.9                                 0.72963  
 R-squared                            0.376431                           Mean dependent var   
 Adj. R-squared                  0.175233                           S.D. dependent var.             
 F-statistic                            2.761578                           Akaike AIC                           
Δ is the difference operator. *, stands for statistical significance at the 1% level.  
  
5.4 Granger Causality Result 
In general, the cointegration result is supported by the results reported in Table 7which 
show the existence of causality between economic growth and the three measures of 
fiscal decentralization. There is unidirectional causality between economic growth and 
fiscal decentralization for the three measures of fiscal decentralization, with the 
causality running from fiscal decentralization to economic growth. The granger 
causality results further confirm the decentralization theorem that fiscal 
decentralization promotes economic growth because of the efficiency gains of public 
goods provision by sub national governments tailored to meet preferences of local 
citizens at that levels of government 
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Table 8: Pair-wise Granger Causality Tests 
Null Hypothesis                                                         Obs  F-statistic  Probability  
 
LY does not Granger Cause LFD1                                      
LFD1 does not Granger Cause LY                             
29
29 
7.41977   
5.07363                             
0.7534 
0.0001 
LY   does not Granger Cause LFD2                                    
LFD2 does not Granger Cause LY                             
29
29 
6.92229   
0.04685                             
0.6489 
0.0010 
LY does not Granger Cause LFD3                                       
LFD3 does not Granger Cause LY                              
29
29
8.20032  
7.13853                                
0.8974 
0.0000 
 
6.0 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper examines the long run and causal relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and economic growth in Nigeria over the period 1980 to 2012 within a 
multivariate VAR framework and error correction model. The study employed three 
different measures of fiscal decentralization including sub-national own source revenue 
as a ratio of total central revenue, sub-national expenditure as a ratio of total federal 
expenditures, and sub-national own source revenue as a ratio of total federal 
expenditure. First, results from the cointegration test show significant evidence of a 
long-run relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth in Nigeria. 
Second, results from the long-run normalized cointegration estimates reveal that the 
three measures of fiscal decentralization have a positive and significant relationship 
with economic growth. This finding agrees with the findings of Shahdani et al (2012) 
and Iimi (2005). However, it contradicts the findings of Aigbokhan (1999) and Philip 
and Isah (2012). 
 
The granger causality results support the cointegration results indicating that there 
exists a unidirectional causality running from fiscal decentralization to economic 
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growth in Nigeria during the study period. The implication of this is that greater levels 
of decentralization will promote higher levels of economic growth. 
 
The findings of this study show that fiscal decentralization is unarguably a potent 
economic strategy that can be used to maximize provision of public services as well as 
promote economic growth. Since the present level of decentralization has impacted 
positively on economic growth the study recommends the need for government to 
address the constitutional issue of fiscal powers among the three tiers of government to 
strengthen the fiscal base of sub national governments. 
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